The comparison of absolute capacities, however, is insufficient. What is at stake is not who builds the largest infrastructure, but who possesses the most robust, resilient, and adaptive port governance to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

In the global geopolitical landscape, shaped by the commercial interests of the major powers vying for global hegemony and control of markets, the current debate on port infrastructure in South America is not only strategic, but practically a vital or indispensable factor for maintaining a level of competitiveness and presence in the exchange of goods, especially for exporting countries.

Within this context, Chile finds itself at a crucial crossroads. The emergence of the Chancay port megaproject in Peru has raised alarms in various Chilean economic and political circles, generating a narrative that suggests the country is falling behind in the race for port supremacy in the Pacific. However, this partial view overlooks substantive elements regarding the true capacity of the Chilean port system, its institutional framework, and the strategic strengths accumulated over decades.

Chancay: Myth and Reality

The port of Chancay, financed primarily with Chinese capital, is presented as an emerging competitor with projections of handling between 1 and 1.5 million containers annually in its first phase. While impressive for a new terminal, this figure pales in comparison to the consolidated operations of Chilean ports such as San Antonio and Valparaíso, which already handle similar or higher volumes. Indeed, San Antonio closed 2024 with 1.8 million TEUs transferred, while Valparaíso is approaching one million. Furthermore, the planned Outer Port of San Antonio is projected to handle up to 6 million TEUs at full capacity, reinforcing Chile’s structural advantage.

The comparison of absolute capacities, however, is insufficient. What’s at stake is not who builds the largest infrastructure, but who possesses the most robust, resilient, and adaptive port governance to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In this area, Chile retains significant advantages, although these are under threat if prompt action is not taken.

Institutional Framework

Since the enactment of Law 19.542 a decade ago, Chile has adopted a mixed port model, separating public and private operation. This scheme, by auctioning terminals for non-renewable 30-year terms and establishing the mandatory return of infrastructure to the State, created a system with programmed cyclical renewal. This institutional design prevented the system from aging, attracted private investment, and fostered competition, resulting in high port productivity.

However, this same design imposes a time limit, because each expired concession requires a new bidding process. Herein lies one of the major current problems. With the exception of Terminal 1 in Valparaíso, no state-owned port has formally initiated the re-concession process. This is serious, as a tender process takes, on average, seven years from the initial study to the start of operations for the new concessionaire. Bureaucratic inertia and the upcoming change in port company boards could further delay this process, creating an operational gap with critical effects on service continuity.

Connectivity and Public Investment

The debate surrounding the Outer Port of San Antonio has diverted attention from immediate problems, such as the precarious road and rail connectivity at key terminals like San Antonio and San Vicente in southern Chile. The works at the Barrancas Rail Terminal in San Antonio, and the improvements to the Biobío rail network in San Vicente, are important but insufficient steps. Without an agile logistics network, any expansion of port capacity will be limited by upstream bottlenecks. The paradox is that a large part of these investments falls on the State, since concessionaires cannot finance improvements to assets they do not manage, and with contracts about to expire, they are also unwilling to invest in assets that will soon pass into the hands of third parties.

Furthermore, the correct valuation of contingent liabilities—a topic almost invisible in the public debate—represents a silent but powerful barrier. International accounting standards (IFRS, NIC 37) require that the value of works that will revert to the treasury be reflected in the balance sheets. The lack of consensus between ceding parties and concessionaires on these values ​​can lead to legal disputes or paralyze entire bidding processes.

Comprehensive Agenda

Given this scenario, the Chilean strategy should not be a spasmodic or alarmist reaction to the “Chancay effect,” but rather a comprehensive agenda with short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. This agenda must include an immediate call for new tenders and accelerated investment in logistics connectivity. Without resolving port access issues, any capacity gains will be nullified by structural inefficiencies.

Clarity and transparency in accounting liabilities are another factor this agenda must consider, because anticipating audits and establishing unified depreciation criteria are key to avoiding legal conflicts.

Finally, effective institutional coordination is essential. The Ministries of Transportation, Public Works, Finance, Environment, and port companies must act in a coordinated and strategic manner. Fragmentation is the most dangerous enemy of the port system’s development.

Second Technological Leap

Far from stagnating, the Chilean port system is showing signs of vitality. San Antonio saw an 11% increase in TEU throughput in the first two months of 2025. TPS in Valparaíso maintains demanding operating standards and is carrying out significant expansions. These achievements confirm that Chile does not need to copy foreign models, but rather refine its own. The key lies not in more concrete, but in better public management.

In conclusion, Chile possesses a legal and operational structure that has proven successful. The real challenge is to honor this model, avoid complacency, and maintain the continuity of visionary policies. Regional port competitiveness will not be won with isolated megaprojects, but with integrated, reliable, and efficient systems. If Chile decides to move decisively, as it did in the 1990s, it will be in a position not only to compete with Chancay, but also to transform it into a strategic partner in the Pacific, within a strengthened port network.